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роЗробка сПособу виЯвленнЯ 
атак в реальноМу часі на основі 
обчислювального інтелекту
Розроблено спосіб виявлення атак в реальному часі на основі обчислювального інтелекту, 
який відрізняється застосуванням методу генетичного програмування для побудови профілів 
атак, і дозволяє оцінювати та виявляти атаки, які ще не були досліджені чи визначені, але їх 
наслідки вже були виявлені. Було проведено експериментальне дослідження прототипу системи 
виявлення атак.
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1. introduction
There are a number of possible actions that could 
compromise the protected computing system; accordingly, 
there are no fewer factors that indicate the presence or 
absence of intrusion into the system. Finding analytical 
solution for the determination of related events in the 
system to the presence of intrusion into distributed com-
puting systems (DCS) is possible only in partial form for 
specific types of intrusions and specific events in the DCS. 
Alternatively, the empirical method of regression models 
can find a solution to the problem of a more general case, 
and less intervention of the user (DCS administrator).
Solving problems using a regression model is the search for 
the expression and its ratios to input parameters substituted 
in expressions, given the appropriate output values. Genetic 
programming is one of the method of solving the symbolic 
regression problem with the ability to create structure of 
decisions during implementation, and the method of pre-
sentation of solutions in the form of trees, which coincides 
with the structural notation of symbolic expressions.
Thus presenting problems in intrusion detection into 
DCS as symbolic regression tasks on event data in the 
system allows creating a monitoring tool for DCS based 
on symbolic regression, as one of the methods of com-
putational intelligence.
2.  object of the study and its  
technological audit
The object of the study is a security monitoring system 
for distributed computing system. The subject of research 
is the way to implement security monitoring system for 
distributed computing system based on computational in-
telligence. There is a problem of detecting intrusion into 
computing systems, namely the lack of an effective way 
of monitoring for detecting distributed attacks for the 
anomalous behavior of the system in real time.
3. aim and tasks of the study
The aim of the study is to provide such a security 
monitoring system that will automatically monitor events 
in a secure information system and detect suspicious events 
based on analysis of data on previous successful intrusions 
into other computing systems. Data analysis of previous 
successful intrusion into DCS is done by using the method 
of genetic programming.
The main tasks to achieve the aim of the study:
1. Analysis of existing approaches to security monitor-
ing systems for different types of distributed systems and 
approaches to the analysis of security events to determine 
the possible compromising system.
2. Development of a new way of security monitoring 
using genetic programming method for the analysis of 
security events.
3. Design of models for classical and developed ap-
proaches to create a security monitoring system for further 
analysis and obtaining the results of the experiment.
4. Analysis of experiment results using developed models.
4.  literature review of intrusion detection 
into distributed systems
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are the separate class 
of software tools by which to understand the program, 
rules and accompanying documentation and information 
relating to the functioning of information processing sys-
tem. In [1] the basic features, principles and mechanisms 
of IDS functioning are considered and in [2] the issue 
of environment sustainability by information exchange 
are revealed.
Search of information about a single event in the audit 
logs of various protection tools. The complexity of the 
search results from the fact that different protection tools 
in different register the information about events. For 
example, information about virus attacks in the case of 
viral epidemic will be registered simultaneously by means 
of virus protection, intrusion detection systems, firewalls, 
and operating system logs in servers and workstations [3]. 
Monitoring systems in conventional terminology are 
indicated by the acronym SIM (Security Information 
Management) or SIEM (Security Information and Event 
Management) [4].
Currently, the most widely used security information 
commercial event monitoring system: ArcSight, Cisco 
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MARS, RSA Envision, NetForensics, NetIQ, Symantec 
and others. It should be noted that in addition there are 
also free open source monitoring system. An example of 
such a system is Prelude Universla SIM [5]. ArcSight 
ESM allows monitoring of all necessary resources in real 
time, receiving information at the level of the protection 
tools and the level of network resources, applications and 
databases, allowing building a comprehensive monitoring 
and event management system for information security [6].
A brief comparison of intrusion detection technologies 
are shown in Table 1.
table 1






Number of detected attacks
Limited by known 
types of attacks
Limited by IDS 
analysis methods 
The probability of crossing attack Average Low
The probability of false alarm Very low High
Requirements for computing resources Average High
In the absence of mathematical foundations and for-
malize the process of detecting unauthorized actions and 
attacks it can be concluded that the current approach is 
not focused on the development of efficient mathemati-
cal support and software of computers, complexes and 
computer networks [1].
Genetic programming (GP) in the field of computational 
intelligence is an evolutionary algorithmic methodology 
inspired by the phenomenon of biological evolution. GP is 
one of the machine learning method to optimize a popula-
tion of computer programs according to the fitness value, 
defined as the ability of the program to perform certain 
computational problems [7]. GP develops and improves 
computer programs that are traditionally represented in 
memory as a tree structure [8]. Thus, GP traditionally 
preferred programming languages that naturally embody 
tree structure (e. g., Lisp; other functional programming 
languages are appropriate). GP compares favorably with 
algorithms of hill climbing, gradient descent and simulated 
annealing by the fact that they aren’t «greedy». GP and 
evolutionary computation are the good way to meet the 
challenges of building a topology of the system and its 
configuration [9].
The main features, principles and mechanisms of func-
tioning of IDS tasks were considered and analyzed. An 
analysis of the known methods and approaches to detect 
attacks made the following conclusions:
1. IDS facilitate solution for information security ad-
ministrators such problems as the recognition of known 
and unknown attacks, the analysis of patterns of abnormal 
actions, monitoring and analysis of user activity, system 
and network activity.
2. Use of monitoring systems can increase the efficiency 
of detection and response to incidents of information se-
curity. This is achieved by automating the collection and 
analysis of recording information. Application of monitoring 
system also improves the efficiency of already installed 
protection tools.
3. There are two main ways to detect attacks: sig-
nature method and anomaly detection method. The first 
method is simpler in terms of implementation, requires 
fewer resources from the computing system and ensures 
fewer false responses. The second method is more re liable 
in terms of security, as it has the ability to identify new 
and hitherto unknown attacks, and more flexible to con-
figure. Some IDS combine these two methods to ensure 
better protection and acceptable performance of the se-
curity monitoring systems.
4. Existing systems for monitoring the DCS security 
do not guarantee detection of all attacks and the lack of 
false IDS responses.
5. materials and methods of the study
metrics of security. Important metrics for intrusion 
detection system are performance of the percentage of 
detected attacks or rather the inverse percentage charac-
teristic of escaped attacks. In fact, there are two such 
characteristics because errors in detecting attacks are the 
first and the second kind. Detection error of the first kind 
is when IDS pass off the attack as a normal behavior of 
the system.
Error of the second kind is when the system believes 














where Ntot — the total number of IDS responses; Ndet — 
the number of detected attacks; Nat — the number of 
attempts to attack the system. It should be noted that 
the value of KII (coefficient of error of the second kind) 
may be more than one.
Also as a metric the authors would consider the number 
of runs for computational intelligence methods (genetic 
programming), which lead to the correct result. Since the 
methodologies of computational intelligence are heuristic, 
their convergence can be proved analytically. Therefore, 
the authors examined the concept of the success rates of 
the genetic programming for 100 runs. The criterion for 
the rub success the authors considered a deviation from 
the ideal result not more than 5 % on 50 generations of 
the algorithm — is the ideal case, and the second crite-
rion — getting a result for 200 generations. The system 
automatically stopped working after reaching the 200-th 












As mentioned, there are two main types of intrusion 
detection systems — profile and anomalous. Both types 
have certain advantages and disadvantages. IDS on the 
basis of attack profile requires few resources and less sus-
ceptible to errors of the second kind, but can’t provide 
protection against unknown and modified attacks. IDS on 
the basis of anomalies can adjust to change and unknown 
attacks, but has a high delay the work, requires a lot of 
computing resources and an increased sensitivity to errors 
of the third kind.
The proposed intrusion detection system is a hybrid 
IDS type. It is based on the use of attack profiles and 
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is fast and doesn’t depend on computing resources; but 
the profiles of attacks are by generated empirical method 
for security message of previous attacks and secure state 
of different systems.
Fig. 1 shows a schematic diagram of developed hybrid 
IDS. Generally it works like intrusion detection system based 
on signatures, but signatures (profiles of attacks) are created 
automatically by means of genetic programming. GP system 
takes as input secure archives of events of security informa-
tion system and other information systems, along with a note 
on the estimated level of risk in the system (for example, 
if the system was pre- or post-factum detected attack, the 
appropriate system log is sent to the server of GP system).
Thus, the proposed intrusion detection system dif-
fers from existing that combines performance of profile 
IDS and accurate of attack detection of abnormal IDS, 
through the use of computational intelligence to build 
profiles of attacks (not in real time) based on the archives 
of security events and their subsequent usage to detect 
attacks in real time.
Unlike standard IDS types, proposed intrusion detec-
tion system allows evaluating and detecting attacks that 
have not been explored or identified, but their effects have 
been found. According to submitted for entry archive of 
security events (log of events) GP system is able to find 
the correlation of certain events and messages that are 
present in the logs at the time of the attack, and absent 
in a secure condition of the system.
Based on the scheme of the system, it can determine 
that the complete subroutine libraries should be used for 
the next operations:
— Processing tree data structures (creation, tree tra-
versal, choose of random elements).
— The use of symbolic algebra (representing expressions 
in the form of symbols of the programming language).
Search of subroutine libraries for implementation of 
these functions was conducted.
Popular open source library Zippers (clojure.zip), which 
includes the implementation of tree operations made fully 
in functional style. As a library for the use of symbolic 
algebra it was enough operational features of Clojure 
language, which representing expressions in the form of 
symbols and the compilation of these expressions in the 
program.
Search of existing libraries was conducted to realize 
the directly generalized genetic operations. All founded 
Java-libraries were closed, so genetic operations were writ-
ten manually for the prototype program.
Software package ECJ (Evolutionary Computing in 
Java) was also used for the second part of the testing 
genetic programming systems [10].
Apache Storm platform was used for implementation of 
the processing security events from different sources of in-
formation exchange in real time [11]. Apache Storm is a free 
and open source distributed computing system in real time. 
Storm allows easy and reliable process endless streams of 
data and is Hadoop analogue for data processing in real 
time. Storm has many options for application: real time 
analytics, machine learning, continuous computing, DCS 
and other. Storm is fast platform: it provides more than 
one million processed data items per second on a single 
node. It is a scalable, fault-tolerant, ensures that the data 
will be processed, and easily configured and managed.
6. research results and their discussion
6.1. description of the experimental environment. Simu-
lation model of secure information system was developed 
for comparative analysis. It generates events occurring in 
the system. These events are the typed logs with a direct 
fig. 1. Scheme of developed hybrid IDS
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access of the intrusion detection 
system to the fields. Thus, the 
step of analysis (parsing) of mes-
sages in the system was missed 
in an experimental environment.
6.2. Experiments. There were 
three experiments in creation of 
attack profile using genetic pro-
gramming and using the resul-
ting profile in intrusion detection 
system in real time. Appropriate 
generators of messages were crea-
ted for each of experiments in 
the system. They were matched 
the type of attack. Below there 
are expanded information on each 
of the experiments.
6.3. attempt to log in the sys-
tem as root user. 50 sets of in-
put data for genetic programming 
system were generated for this experiment. Each set is 
consistent of pre sence or absence of intrusion attempts, 
respectively, each set contained a number of unsuccessful 
attempts to enter the system as user «root». Based on 
input data, genetic programming system was built attack 
profile, which was the formula by which the level of dan-
ger was determined. Fig. 2 shows a simplified example of 
obtained profile.
The following results were obtained from amount of 
generations to finding a potential solution at every run 
of genetic programming system: 62 runs were able to find 
a solution with an error of less than 5 % in less than 
50 generations. In 16 runs, the system was unable to get 
even a rough attack profile.
fig. 2. Generated profile of detecting attack on root user
After receiving attack profiles, one of them was tested 
on another set of input data (generated again, which was 
not involved in the study). Fig. 3 shows a comparison 
of a real threat in the dataset (by setting the generator) 
and calculated threat. The threat of intrusion changes 
from 0 to 1 and is divided into three categories — low 
risk, medium risk and high risk.
It can be see that in 35 of 50 cases the attack profile 
correctly identified the level of danger for input data; in 
6 cases profile did not reveal a possible attack where it 
was (error of the first kind); and in 9 cases the attack 
was more likely found where it was not (error of the 
second kind).
6.4. malicious use of «heartbleed» error. In April 2014 
it was discovered error (bug) in the code of OpenSSL 
library, which is used by 66 % of servers on the Internet 
to support encryption protocols SSL/TLS. This vulnerabi-
lity allows obtaining valuable information from the server, 
including logs of recent events, user private keys and other 
data that could accidentally find themselves on the same 
page memory area that OpenSSL library [12].
This experiment aims to investigate whether able the 
developed intrusion detection system to determine the pat-
tern of input data, which leads to compromising OpenSSL 
server. The function, which returns the size of the mes-
sage, was added in the set of terminal operators. Fig. 4 
shows a greatly simplified obtained profile. Profile has 
a look that truly reflects the nature of the vulnerability.
fig. 4. Generated profile of detecting attack  
on «Heartbleed» vulnerability
fig. 3. Output and calculated danger value for different input data (experiment 1)
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Taking into account the number of generations to finding 
a potential solution at every run of genetic program-
ming system, the following results were obtained: only in 
30 cases, the system was able to find a possible solution, 
and only three were spent on it at least 50 generations. 
Start of genetic programming was automatically stopped 
when reaching the mark of 200 generations.
Checking the best profile that was obtained after 52-th 
run is shown in Fig. 5. Despite the difficulty of obtaining 
the profile in the previous step, it was relatively accurate 
in dealing with no training data. According to the graph, 
in 25 of 50 cases the attack profile correctly identified the 
level of risk; in 23 cases profile made a error of the first 
kind; and in 2 cases — an error of the second kind. Such 
high ratio of errors of the first kind to the second kind 
is possible explain that the resulting profile as a whole 
does not hold high values of danger. Since the error of 
the first kind, in practice, more important, this can be 
attributed to a significant disadvantage of the generated 
attack profile.
6.5. server port scanning. Data set was automatically 
generated to emulate this scenario that emulates the output 
of utility tcpdump, i. e. log of TCP-packets. Scenario was 
considered for case when potential 
attacker use TCP SYN-packets to 
check which ports are open on the 
server for further intrusion. This 
is a particular problem in that 
port scanning is also engaged in 
legitimate programs to determine 
which services are available on 
the selected host.
Fig. 6 shows a simplified pro-
file obtained by genetic program-
ming of the system. The following 
results were obtained for amount 
of spent generations to finding a 
potential solution at every start 
of genetic programming system: 
in 79 cases, the system was able 
to find a possible solution, 45 of 
these solutions was conducted 
over 50 generations or less.
This is a good result, given 
that the profile in Fig. 6 often met 
in the results of the GP system.
Fig. 7 shows the results of 
one of the obtained profiles for 
new data that did not participate 
in the learning system.
The graph clearly noticeable 
that profile often works on data 
sets that do not attempt to attack. 
This high number of errors of 
the second kind can be explained 
by the fact that port scanning 
is not necessarily an attribute or 
signs or intrusion into the system. 
Since the generated profile isn’t 
found relationship between the 
number of TCP SYN-messages 
from one address and the pro-
bability of attack (i. e., profile calculated the total number of 
SYN-packets from all addresses), over the test of server ports 
by legitimate client applications was deemed as the attack. 
fig. 5. Output and calculated danger values at different input data (experiment 2)
fig. 6. Generated profile of detecting attacks by port scanning
fig. 7. Output and calculated danger value for different input data (experiment 3)
ИнформацИонные технологИИ
45Technology audiT and producTion reserves — № 3/1(29), 2016
ISSN 2226-3780
Thus, according to the results of testing IDS profile correctly 
identified the level of risk in 28 of 50 cases, committed 
3 errors of the first kind and 19 errors of the second kind.
Comparison of experimental results for three types of 
attacks on distributed system is given in Table 2.
table 2
Comparative table of IDS simulation results
Experiment KI KII S50 S200
Attempt to login in the system as root 0,2 0,3 0,62 0,84
OpenSSL vulnerability «Heartbleed» 0,657 0,057 0,03 0,32
Server port scanning 0,1 0,633 0,45 0,79
As shown in the Table 2 developed IDS model allows:
— Accurately identify potential conventional attacks.
— Quite firmly, but with a lot of errors of the second 
kind, detect not obvious attacks that are often similar 
to normal operation of the system and its users.
— With mediocre reliability and complexity of obtaining 
profiles detect new types of attacks and vulnerabilities, 
which is unable to carry out any of the existing IDS 
at the profiles of attacks (as opposed to IDS based 
on anomalies).
The practical value of the results determined by their 
focus on creating effective tools that support the security 
management of DCS resources at a constant amount of 
resources that can increase the security level of the com-
puter network and the effectiveness of security controls, 
as well as the creation of specialized environments for 
research and analysis of DCS security mechanisms. The 
methods can be used to monitor distributed computing 
systems that provide the gas transmission system, power 
supply systems.
This article is a continuation of the authors’ works 
in the development of methods and tools for intrusion 
detection in distributed computing systems using artificial 
intelligence [13]. In future studies the authors plan to 
develop mechanism for detection of distributed attacks 
using mobile security agents to find the best options for 
placing components of information security.
7. conclusions
As a result of research:
1. Existing approaches and basic features, principles and 
mechanisms of security monitoring of distributed systems 
were analyzed. It was shown that the existing monitoring 
system of DCS security not guarantee detection of all 
attacks and the lack of false positives.
2. These metrics intrusion detection system: error of 
intrusion detection and the number of start for method 
of genetic programming that lead to the correct result. 
A hybrid detection system was proposed based on the 
use of attack profiles that generated by empirical method 
based on previous attacks and secure state of the system.
3. The model of proposed intrusion detection system 
was developed that allows evaluating and detecting at-
tacks that have not been explored or identified, but their 
effects have been found.
4. The experimental prototype research intrusion detec-
tion system based on genetic programming was done. We 
consider three scenarios that are fundamentally different from 
each other by different characteristics. Each of them was 
held two-step full cycle of the system — identification of 
attack profile and checking the profile for new input data. 
It was established that the developed model can detect: 
with high precision — traditional potential attacks, with 
many errors of the second kind — not obvious attacks, 
with the mediocre reliability and complexity of obtaining 
profile — new types of attacks and vulnerabilities.
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раЗработка сПособа обнаружениЯ атак в реальноМ 
вреМени на основе вычислительного интеллекта
Разработан способ обнаружения атак в реальном времени 
на основе вычислительного интеллекта, который отличается 
применением метода генетического программирования для 
построения профилей атак и позволяет оценивать и выявлять 
атаки, которые еще не были исследованы или определены, 
но их последствия уже были обнаружены. Было проведено 
экспериментальное исследование прототипа системы обнару-
жения атак. 
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Розглядається проблема проектування інтелектуальних систем управління (ІСУ) динаміч-
но-змінними об’єктами (ДО), що функціонують в умовах суттєвої апріорної невизначеності. 
Представлено аналіз існуючих підходів до побудови ІСУ ДО, методів, моделей і алгоритмів їх 
побудови на основі інтеграції класичних методів теорії управління і методів штучного інтелек-
ту. В якості прикладів ДО розглядаються рухомий склад багаторежимних підприємств (ТП).
ключові слова: інтелектуальні системи, динамічно-змінні об’єкти, транспортні підприємства, 
нейромережеві алгоритми, нейронні мережі.
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1. вступ
Задача синтезу нелінійного управління ТП (транспорт-
ним підприємством) є опис процесів в ТП в різних станах. 
Однак, як вже зазначалося раніше [1] вплив факторів 
невизначеності (зміна умов оптимізації та режимів робо-
ти ТП) значно впливає на процес зміни параметрів моделі 
структури, внаслідок чого виникає завдання адаптації 
параметрів САК (Система Автоматичного Керування) 
для підтримки необхідної якості процесів управління. На 
практиці найбільш часто використовуються два методи 
вирішення цього завдання: синтез адаптивного регуля-
тора з фіксованою структурою і параметрами алгоритму 
адаптації, і синтез САК в класі систем з навчанням, тоб-
то систем, які в процесі свого функціонування можуть 
змінювати свою структуру і параметри для досягнення 
необхідної мети управління. Актуальністю роботи в даному 
напрямку є те що в постійному розвитку промисловості 
і транспортних підприємств у світі в умовах жорсткої 
економіки і невизначеності подальшого розвитку кон’юнк-
тури ринку необхідно розробляти нові підходи щодо 
управління підприємством на основі нейронних мереж.
2.  аналіз літературних даних 
та постановка проблеми
Дослідження в галузі оцінки та оптимізації складності 
САК динамічними об’єктами мають півстолітню історію. 
Разом з тим, указані вище підходи, визначаючи необхідні 
напрямки досліджень стосовно до САК динамічно-змін-
ними об’єктами, не вказують формальних алгоритмів та 
методик синтезу ІСУ ТП на основі критерію мінімальної 
складності при виконанні заданих вимог до якості процесів 
управління в умовах невизначеності режимів роботи ТП 
і зміни зовнішнього середовища. В останніх публікаціях 
та дослідженнях відображається ця проблема, так у [1] 
